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We introduce an incomplete markets general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic risk,
where production is nanced via stock market, and where ownership structure endogenized.
This model is a variation of Dr eze (1974), Grossman and Hart (1979), and Magill and
Quinzii (2002). The paper discusses two main corporate equilibrium properties. It shows
that (i) the class of centralized objective functions introduces a further source of ineciency
into the organization of production, and (ii) the indeterminacy of corporate equilibria. (iii)
It further shows the separation of the economic decisions of the agents.
1 Introduction
The seminal paper on production in incomplete markets dates back to Diamond [1]. He
shows that under the assumption of multiplicative uncertainty the unique equilibrium
in an one good, single agent economy is constraint ecient. Dr eze [2], Grossman and
Hart [3], and Magill and Quinzii [5] add more structure to this model and consider a two
period model. Adding more structure to the economic model introduces a new economic
phenomenon. Quinzii et al. [4] show that for this class of models equilibria are generally
constrained inecient.
This paper elaborates on this ineciency property. It identies a new source of inef-
ciency deriving from the utility dependent objective functions of the rms. The paper
then studies the Modigliani and Miller theorem for the model introduced in this paper,
and shows the separation of economic decisions of the agents. This is a rst step towards
a generalization of the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model to incomplete
markets.
Our model diers from the literature in three aspects. It considers technological
uncertainty rather aggregate uncertainty, production is nanced through the stock market,
and ownership is endogenized. For this economic scenario, the paper shows that the
organization of productive activities is generally inecient. It identies the organization
of production as a further source of ineciency. This result is a consequence of the utility
dependent objective function of the rm. The paper shows that for this class of models
nancial policies are indeterminate, and that economic decisions can be separated. The
later result is a weak form of the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model.
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12 The Economic Model and Results
In the single agent reduced form model, the agent performs the role as a consumer and as
a producer. As a consumer the agent buys stocks z and receives a proportion of the real
value of the rm (z) = 1 (in this case) in the next period in return. As a producer the
agent issues the quantity of stocks b in order to nance a project. The return of nancial
investment the agent obtains as a consumer is denoted R( y;s)z, and the dividend payo








++  R+ :
p(0)x(0) = p(0)!(0)   ( z)p(0)y(0)   qz + qb





where R( y;s) =
D( y;s)
^ b is the dividend payo per stock issued. Let  = z +b; then the





++  R :
p(0)x(0) = p(0)!(0)   ( z)p(0)y(0)   q
p(s)x(s) = p(s)!(1) + ( z)p(s)y(s) + R( y;s)

; (2)
where p(0)y(0) denotes the investment costs in period one associated with revenue
p(s)y(s) in each state of nature s 2 f1;:::;Sg in period two. In this model the rm's
production set is Y = RS+1 if only one good in each state of nature is considered (otherwise
Rl(S+1)). Note that a price normalization implies that p(0) = 1, and p(s) = 1 in every




y 2 RS+1 : (y)  0
	
: Standard assumptions for smooth technology sets apply.
Ownership of the rm (:) is a function of quantity of stocks purchased as a consumer.
Denition 1 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations
( x;  ;  y) for generic initial resources ! 2 
 if following conditions are satised:
(i)
 
 x;  ;  y

argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bg
(ii)   = 0: (3)
Condition (ii) implies that the quantity of stocks that the consumer buys is equal to
the quantity of stocks he issues as a producer.  denotes the net trade of stocks, where
at equilibrium   = 0 is satised. For the case that more than one consumption good is
considered,  x(0) = !(0) +  y(0); and  x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all states of nature hold. The
agent's optimization problem is to choose  and y such that utility of x is maximized.
Propositions (1), (2), and (3) state that in a single agent reduced form model, the
utility maximization problem has a solution. The rst two propositions show a rst step
towards modeling nancial assets (on consumer side only), where  implying z and b
implicitly contained in , and for the case that the agent as a consumer takes nancial
policy of the rm b as given and chooses z to nance his preferred consumption bundle x.
Proposition (3) shows the equivalence of these models.
2Proposition 1 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations  
 x;  ;  y

of the maximization problem (i), if and only if for generic initial resources ! 2 

 q is a no-arbitrage price (4)
is satised.
Denition 2 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations
( x;  z;  y) for for generic initial resources ! 2 
 if following conditions are satised:
(i) ( x;  z;  y)argmaxfu(x) : (x;z;y) 2 Bzg
(ii)  z +^ b = 0
(5)
and  x(0) = !(0) +  y(0); and  x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s hold for l > 1.
Proposition 2 ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations
( x;  z;  y) of the maximization problem (i), if and only if for generic initial resources ! 2 

 q is a no-arbitrage price (6)
is satised.
Proposition 3 The reduced form model (1) and the reduced form model (2) are equivalent
if
  =  z +^ b (7)
The reduced form model (2) is equivalent to the reduced form model (1) if
 z +^ b =  : (8)
We now expand the reduced form model to an economic framework where decisions
of the single agent are separated. This allows to introduce two separated optimizations
problems, one for each role the agent plays. This example, although very simple, is
non-trivial.
Suppose that the consumer assigns to the rm his own present value vector : The
objective of the agent as a producer is, given his own present value vector, to maximize
the present value of streams of prots. This economic framework is suciently rich in
structure in order to show the separation of activities of the agent as a consumer and as
a producer. This is a weak form of the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu
model.
Proposition 4 ( p;  q) is a separated activities reduced form equilibrium with associated
equilibrium allocations ( x;  ;( y)), for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if and only if for  
assigned to the objective function of the rm it satises:
(i)
 
 x;  

argmaxfu( x) :  x 2 Bg
(ii) ( y)argmax
  py : y 2 Y
	
(iii)   = 0:
(9)
Remark 1 As a producer, the agent maximizes a present value problem not independent
of information contained in the utility of the consumer. This makes sense in this one
agent set up if one is willing to think of this model as an entrepreneurship model.
3Proposition (5) shows the inecient organization of production of the reduced form
model with separated activities of the agent. The degree of ineciency introduced into
the model depends on the consumer's present value vector.
Proposition 5 The organization of production is generally (in)ecient for any assigned
present value  to the objective function.
The model is production ecient, if there does not exist a production plan ^ y 6= y
in Y such that u(^ x) > u(x): Alternatively, it is sucient to expand the model to two
consumers, and then, need to assign some arbitrarily determined average present value i
to the objective function of the rm. It is easy to see that for any dierent present value
vector assigned to the rm net activities change accordingly, hence u(^ x) 6= u(x).
The nal result considers in the simplest form the irrelevance of nancial policy theo-
rem of Modigliani and Miller [6]. The theorem states that whatever nancial policy a rm
chooses, consumers can always undo this, leaving eects on real allocations unchanged.
For that, we add more structure to the model and introduce an extensive form model of

















is the nancial payo matrix (vector, here).
D(s)
b
denotes the payo per stock issued in a particular state of nature. As a consumer, the
agent takes (p;q;b;y) as given and chooses z which nances his most preferred consump-
tion bundle x. As a producer he takes (p;q;x;z) and present value vector  as given and
chooses b and y such that present value prots are maximized. This is formally introduced
in following denition.
Denition 3 ( p;  q) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium alloca-
tions ( x;  z);( y; b); for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if following conditions are satised:











(iii)  z + b = 0.
(11)
Proposition (6) asserts that the precise nature of the producer's nancial policy has
no real eects on equilibrium allocations, provided it nances the producer's production
plan. The result follows from showing the equivalence between the extensive form and the
reduced form model where nancial policies are not explicitly modeled. Two properties
of this model make the proof work. (i) as a consumer and as a producer the agent has
access to the same market subspace hi, and (ii) a no-arbitrage condition  = 0 holds.
Hence, nancial polices do not aect the budget set of the consumer, nor the present value
of future streams of prots generated by the producer. As a consumer, the single agent
can always undo the nancial activities taken as a producer. The value of the rm de-
pends only on the production plan chosen by the producer, and not on its nancial policy.
4Proposition 6 If ( p;  q) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations ( x;  z);( y; b), then ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium
allocations ( x;  ;  y) for generic initial resources ! 2 
 where
  =  z + b (12)
If ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations ( x;  ;  y), then
( p;  q) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations ( x;  z), ( y; b)
for generic initial resources ! 2 
 and for all ( z; b) satisfying
z + b =  : (13)
3 Conclusion
The paper shows indeterminacy of corporate equilibria for a model with inecient orga-
nization of production. It identies the source of productive organizational ineciency as
a consequence of the utility dependent objective function of the rm. It further shows a
preliminary result on the separation of economic activities of the agents.
The results suggest that the inecient organization of production can be eliminated if
it is possible to derive objective functions independent of the utilities of the shareholders.
This is equivalent to generalizing the decentralization theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model
to incomplete markets. This research is initiated in Stiefenhofer [7].
A Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
Proof 1 (Proposition 1) Forming the Lagrangean
L
 
 x;  ;  y;  ;  

= u(x)   (0)[ p(0)x(0)    p(0)!(0) +  q   ( z) p(0)y(0)]
 
XS
s=1 (s)[ p(s)x(s)    p(s)!(1) + ( z) p(s)y(s) + R( y;s)]
 
XS
s=0 (s)( y) (14)
The necessary and sucient conditions for (x;;y) to be a solution of L, are that there
exists  2 R
S+1





 x;  ;  y;  ;  

 0
is satised. This is equivalent to







 r( y) =   p
 p x    p! = ( z) p y + ( y;  p) 

















: Then  q =
PS
s=1  (s) p(s) y(s): It follows
from the rst order conditions that







Proof 2 (Proposition 2) The necessary and sucient conditions for (x;z;y) to be a
solution of L, are that there exists  2 R
S+1
++ ; and  2 R
S+1
++ such that
rL( x;  z;  y;  ;  )  0
is satised. This is equivalent to







 r( y) =   p
 p x    p! = ( z) p y + ( p;  y) z
( y) = 0 (17)
Proof 3 (Proposition 3) From (1) have   = 0; and from (2) have  z + ^ b = 0. The
equivalence follows from   =  z +^ b = 0:




  py : y 2 Y
	
(18)
is well dened. Since the rst order conditions are such that there exists  2 R
S+1
++ : From
rL( y)  0 (19)
have
  p =  r( y) (20)
it follows that






ru( x) =   p (21)
Proof 5 (Proposition 5) The source of ineciency comes from the no-arbitrage con-
dition,  = 0. This equation is indeterminate for the case that S > n. Therefore for








f py : y 2 Y g (22)
6Proof 6 (Proposition 6) (1) show that ( x;  ;  y) satises the rst order conditions so
that (i) in denition of a reduced form equilibrium is satised. The rst order conditions
are
 p x    p ! =  p y +  b +  z; and   = 0 (23)
which is equivalent to
 p x    p ! =  p y +  ; and   = 0 (24)
since   =  z +  b holds, so that rst order condition (above) holds. Next, show what the
no-arbitrage condition implies for the rm for all ( y; b); the present value of the rm to
the producer reduces to
  p y =   p y +   b =   p y (25)
Thus the producer's problem in the extensive form equilibrium denition is equivalent to
( y)argmax
  py : y 2 Y
	
(26)
for which the rst order conditions are given (above). The last step is to recall that the
market clearing condition   =  z + b = 0 holds, and from which the result follows.
(2) show that if ( x;  ;  y) is a solution to the reduced form problem, then the rst order





  py +  b : (y;b) 2 Y  R
	
(27)
since by no-arbitrage condition   = 0: Therefore, can pick any b 2 R; and dene
z =     b (28)
then the rst order condition of extensive form equilibrium is satised by ( x;z), and thus
( x;z) is a solution of the extensive form equilibrium, since ( y; b) is a solution of the
extensive form equilibrium, and the result follows from 0 =   = z + b:
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